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COMMENTS
THE MAKING OF THE 1986 FLORIDA SAFETY BELT LAW:
ISSUES AND INSIGHT
JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM
T HE BILL invited controversy. Whether Florida lawmakers
ought to make seat belt use mandatory sparked impassioned
debate in the Florida Legislature during the 1986 Regular Session.
Opponents of the bill spoke emphatically in defense of personal
freedom; supporters recited facts, study results, and statistics in a
laborious effort to enlighten and persuade. In the end, public
safety prevailed over private autonomy: the Florida Safety Belt
Law (FSBL)' managed to arrive alive.
The Act contains five sections; this Comment focuses primarily
on the first two. 2 Section one expands the scope of the child re-
straint law;3 section two creates the FSBL.4 After examining rele-
vant existing law, the author focuses on the FSBL and the legisla-
tive process from which it emerged. There follows an extended
analysis of the amended child restraint law. Finally, constitutional
questions are examined.
I. BACKGROUND
Florida is not alone in requiring seat belt use. Twenty-six other
jurisdictions have enacted similar statutes,5 and in many other
1. Ch. 86-49, 1986 Fla. Laws 174 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(1)-(10)).
2. The other three sections are self-explanatory. Section 3 specifies the penalty for viola-
tion of the FSBL-twenty dollars including court costs. Id. § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws at 174
(amending FLA. STAT. § 318.18 (1985), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 318.18(9)). Section 4
provides that insurers must reflect any savings from increased seat belt usage in their auto-
mobile insurance rates. Id. § 4, 1986 Fla. Laws at 175 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
627.0635). Section 5 sets the effective date. Id. § 5, 1986 Fla. Laws at 176.
3. Id. § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws at 173 (amending FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)-(4) (1985), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)-(3)).
4. Id. § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws at 174 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614 (1)-(10)).
5. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 210 (1986) Staff Analysis 1 (rev. Apr. 17, 1986)
(on file with committee), reported that "[als of March 31, 1986, 23 states and the District of
Columbia, comprising approximately 59% of the [United States] population, had enacted
legislation mandating the use of safety belts." According to Come July 1 it's buckle up or
break the law, St. Petersburg Times, June 4, 1986, at Al, col. 3, Florida was the twenty-
sixth state to pass such a law. This latter figure, reflecting the most recent acts in other
states, was the one most frequently quoted to legislators. E.g., Fla. S., tape recording of
686 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:685
countries buckling up has long been a legal duty.' Florida's new
law is not, however, the state's first attempt to promote seat belt
use; in the years preceding passage of the FSBL, a child restraint
act,7 an administrative rule,8 and a supreme court decision all ad-
dressed the seat belt issue.
A. The Child Restraint Law
A limited mandatory seat belt use law, the Florida child re-
straint law"0 has been in effect since July 1, 1983. It requires that
children through five years of age be secured by federally tested
and approved child restraint devices." For children under age four,
the device must be a separate carrier; those four to five years of
age may be restrained with either a separate carrier or a seat belt.'2
However, before the legislature assembled in 1986, this law was
limited in its scope. It applied only to parents and legal guardians
transporting their own children in vehicles registered in Florida. s
Thus, drivers were under no legal obligation to secure the children
of others, and the child restraint law did not apply to tourists. In
addition, no parent charged with a violation of the child restraint
law could be convicted if, before his court or hearing appearance,
he tendered proof of his acquisition of a required child restraint
device.' 4 In the FSBL, the legislature dealt with these loopholes.'5
B. Rule 13B-3.12, Florida Administrative Code
Early in 1984, Governor Bob Graham and the Cabinet directed
the Department of General Services to promulgate rules requiring
state employees to wear seat belts when using a motor vehicle on
proceedings (May 28, 1986) (on file with Secretary) [hereinafter cited as May 28 Senate
Debate].
6. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON TRANSP., AN EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
REQUIRING THE WEARING OF SEAT BELTS 81-82 (Jan. 1985) (on file with committee) [herein-
after cited as SENATE STUDY]. In all, 30 jurisdictions around the world now have mandatory
seat belt laws, including Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, and the Soviet
Union. Id.
7. Ch. 82-58, 1982 Fla. Laws 147 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 361.613(1)-(4) (1985)).
8. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 13B-3.12 (1984).
9. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
10. Ch. 82-58, 1982 Fla. Laws 147 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613 (1985)).
11. Ch. 86-49, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 173 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)(a)).
12. Id.
13. FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)(a) (1985).
14. Id. § 316.613(2).
15. Ch. 86-49, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 173 (amending FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)-(4) (1985), to
be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)-(3)).
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state business. 16 In August 1984, the Department adopted Rule
13B-3.12, requiring all persons seated in a vehicle being used on
state business, whether privately owned or leased by the state, to
use their seat belts." Failure to comply with the rule results in
disciplinary action.' 8 The rule provides that when an unrestrained
employee is injured in an accident, and failure to wear a safety belt
contributed to his injuries, his workers' compensation benefits may
be reduced according to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes."9 That
statute requires a twenty-five percent reduction in benefits if the
injury was caused by the employee's willful refusal to use a safety
device or observe a safety rule required by law. 20 For state employ-
ees, then, the new seat belt law complements this existing rule.
C. The Seat Belt Defense: Pasakarnis
In the interim between the Florida Cabinet resolution and the
adoption of Rule 13B-3.2, the Florida Supreme Court took a major
step toward encouraging seat belt use in Insurance Co. of North
America v. Pasakarnis.2' The issue was whether Florida courts
should consider seat belt nonuse as evidence bearing on compara-
tive negligence or the mitigation of damages.22 Though a long line
of Florida authority urged otherwise, the court held that evidence
16. Fla. Cabinet Resolution of Feb. 21, 1984 (unnumbered).
17. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 13B-3.12(1) (1984).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(4) (1985). Few state employees will suffer a reduction in workers'
compensation should they be injured while unbuckled. First, "this statute is an [employer/
carrier's] partial affirmative defense to a claim for benefits." McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc. v.
McCauley, 418 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (citation omitted). To successfully
employ this defense, the state would have to establish willful refusal to use a safety belt.
Willful refusal means "'an intentional commission of an act violative of a statute with
knowledge that such an act is likely to result in serious injury, or the illegal act must be
done with a wanton disregard of probable consequences.'" Id. at 1181 (citations omitted).
But, "'[i]f the employee had some plausible purpose to explain his violation of a rule, the
defenses of violation of safety rules or willful misconduct are inapplicable, even though the
judgment of the employee [may] have been faulty.'" Id. (citation omitted). Given the "sin-
cerely-held conflicting views as to the merits of seat belts," Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141,
1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), the state probably could not prove willful refusal to comply with
Rule 13B-13.12.
21. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
22. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1141; Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147, 1151
(Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
"Comparative negligence" as used in this Comment refers not only to the rule by which a
claimant's award may be reduced in proportion to his percentage of fault, see infra note 34,
but also to a claimant's causal negligence evaluated under comparative negligence princi-
ples. To avoid confusion, "contributory negligence" will be used solely to implicate the older
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of a motorist's failure to use his seat belt could be considered by a
jury in assessing an injured party's damages. 23
In Pasakarnis, Menninger ran a stop sign and collided with a
jeep in which Pasakarnis was riding. The jeep flipped and
Pasakarnis-who was not wearing a safety belt-was thrown from
his vehicle to the pavement, seriously injuring his back.24 As an
affirmative defense, Menninger alleged that Pasakarnis' failure to
use his seat belt was negligence because the safety device would
have prevented or minimized his personal injuries. Menninger con-
tended that Pasakarnis' damages should be reduced in proportion
to his negligence. The trial court granted Pasakarnis' motion to
strike Menninger's affirmative defense, deferring to Florida law's
well-established refusal to recognize a duty to wear a seat belt.2"
However, the court allowed Menninger to depose an engineer-acci-
dent analyst. The expert stated that had Pasakarnis worn his seat
belt and shoulder harness he would not have been tossed from the
jeep, thus sparing him from major injuries. Without hearing this
testimony, the jury found Menninger 100% responsible for the ac-
cident and therefore liable for the total damages-$100,000. A di-
vided Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.2 6 Pasakarnis pro-
vided the Florida Supreme Court with its first opportunity to
examine the seat belt defense.2
The supreme court viewed the lower courts' customary exclusion
of seat belt evidence as "an illogical exception to the doctrine of
comparative negligence, ' 28 and pronounced the seat belt defense
"viable. '29 In doing so, the court rejected a rule that failure to wear
a seat belt amounts to negligence per se because the legislature had
not mandated seat belt use. 30 Because the doctrine of comparative
rule-no longer recognized in Florida-by which a claimant who failed to use reasonable
care could be completely barred from recovery.
23. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 449.
24. Id.
25. The leading case was Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). In
Brown, the defendants tried to raise the defense of contributory negligence based upon
plaintiff's failure to buckle up. The First District affirmed the trial court's decision to strike
the seat belt defense, claiming that "it is not within the province of this court to legislate on
the subject .... Id. at 51. The First District said the defendent could not prove, except by
conjecture, that plaintiff's use of a seat belt would have prevented her injuries. At that time
contributory negligence, if proven, would have barred all recovery; the court's reluctance to
recognize a seat belt defense was, therefore, understandable.
26. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 450.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 453.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 453-54.
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negligence applies only when a plaintiff's negligence is a cause of
the accident-as opposed to behavior that makes his injuries more
severe-the court refused to allow seat belt nonuse to be consid-
ered comparative negligence.31 Instead the court settled on an ap-
proach similar to that taken by the New York Court of Appeals in
its seminal decision, Spier v. Barker.32 Thus, depending upon the
circumstances of the case, a plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt
could amount to a failure to use reasonable care. The defendant
must plead and prove that the plaintiff did not buckle up, that his
failure to do so was unreasonable under the circumstances, and
that the plaintiff's injuries were causally related to his nonuse. If
there is competent evidence proving that nonuse of a seat belt
caused or substantially contributed to all or even part of a plain-
tiff's injuries, the jury should consider that evidence in the compu-
tation of damages. The court cautioned that failure to use a seat
belt must not be considered in resolving the issue of liability unless
such nonuse was found to have been a proximate cause of the
accident.33
This approach requires a jury to distinguish between conduct
that caused the accident and that which contributed to the plain-
tiff's injuries. To confuse the two and allow seat belt nonuse to
affect apportionment of fault when nonuse was not a cause of the
accident not only risks unfairly increasing a plaintiff's liability if
there is a counterclaim, 4 but also risks reducing a plaintiff's award
twice for the same failure.3 5 A plaintiff may, however, suffer a
double reduction in damages if the jury finds his negligence con-
tributed to causing the accident, and that his failure to wear a seat
31. Id. at 454.
32. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974).
33. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
34. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973), converted Florida into a compara-
tive negligence jurisdiction. The court noted that when the negligence of the plaintiff is at
issue, there will undoubtedly be a counterclaim. When this occurs, the jury must apportion
fault between the two claimants; each claimant will then receive an award which reflects the
proportion of his damages caused by the other party. Thus, if seat belt nonuse were added
to the comparative fault equation, the plaintiff would not only see his award reduced in
proportion to his improperly augmented comparative negligence, he also would owe the de-
fendant a greater share of defendant's damages.
35. This anomaly could occur because plaintiff's damages are reduced first for any fault
on his part, and then the amount attributable to his failure to wear a seat belt is subtracted
from the sum remaining. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. If the plaintiff's pro-
portion of the fault were improperly to reflect his seat belt nonuse, the plaintiff would suffer
an unfair "double dip" into his damages award. Although this should not happen in prac-
tice, the plaintiffs' bar complains that it does, and that consequently the two-part damage
reduction process is unfair to plaintiffs. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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belt caused some or all of his injuries, wholly or in part.3 6 When
this occurs the trial court must first reduce the amount of damages
by the proportion of fault borne by the plaintiff, and then reduce
any remaining damages by the percentage owing to his failure to
use a seat belt.37
The supreme court in Pasakarnis imposed upon Florida motor-
ists a duty to buckle up whenever reasonable under the circum-
stances. A critical drawback to this decision is its potential to dev-
astate the layman who learns too late-when he is injured and in
court-that the law not only expects a degree of care not currently
exercised by most people, 38 but also exacts a high price for falling
short of the ideal.
While drafting the seat belt law, Pasakarnis loomed large. The
legislature faced a choice: should it curb a little "judicial policy
making' ' or concur with the state's highest court?
D. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208
An appreciation of all the issues encountered during the evolu-
tion of the FSBL is impossible without a basic understanding of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208,40 a regulation con-
cerning occupant crash protection. As amended in 1984,'4 this
standard requires automobile manufacturers to install automatic
protection systems in passenger cars for sale in this country in ac-
cordance with a schedule designed to increase the percentage of
automobiles so equipped. But the regulation gives states an oppor-
tunity to preclude the introduction of automatic protection sys-
tems by adopting mandatory seat belt use laws which meet certain
criteria.
Standard 208 was adopted in 196742 as one of the rules devel-
oped by the Department of Transportation in response to the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966."3 The Act di-
rects the secretary of transportation to issue practical, objective
36. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 545.
37. Id.
38. The legislature was repeatedly reminded that only about 20% of this state's popula-
tion currently buckles up regularly. If so, Florida is likely enjoying a higher usage rate than
other states. See Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 n.3 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 456.
40. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985).
41. 49 Fed. Reg. 29010 (1984).
42. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982),
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auto safety standards." Standard 208 specifies vehicle performance
levels for protecting occupants when the vehicle crashes.45 Its pur-
pose is to reduce highway deaths and the severity of injuries
through the use of active restraints, such as seat belts, and passive
restraints that require no action by a passenger, such as airbags.' e
The regulation requires manufacturers to install in each passen-
ger car a protection system meeting the requirements of one of
three options detailed in the rule.'7 The first option is the most
demanding. By a combination of passive restraints and seat belt
assemblies,'48 the vehicle must meet the frontal, lateral, and roll-
over crash protection requirements prescribed by the standard. 49
The second option requires installation of passive restraint devices
and seat belt assemblies which allow the vehicle to meet the fron-
tal crash protection requirements in a perpendicular impact.50 The
specifications of the third, and most commonly selected option, are
satisfied by the installation of seat belt assemblies only.51
Manufacturers began to lose the freedom to choose between op-
tions on September 1, 1986.2 After that date, a percentage of each
manufacturer's fleet must comply with the rigorous first option.
The minimum number of cars required to have automatic restraint
systems will increase annually until September 1, 1989." Each pas-
senger car manufactured on or after that date must be equipped
with an automatic protection system which conforms to the first
option. By passing mandatory seat belt use laws that meet the De-
partment's criteria, however, states can bring about the repeal of
the requirement for passive restraint systems. 54 The rule stipulates
that if the secretary of transportation determines by April 1, 1989,
44. Id. § 1392(a).
45. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S1 (1985).
46. Id. § 571.208 S2.
47. Manufacturers had unrestricted freedom to choose which system to include in each
passenger car assembled before September 1, 1986. Id. § 571.208 S4.1.2.
48. Id. § 571.208 S4.1.2.1. "'Seat belt assembly' means any strap, webbing, or similar
device designed to secure a person in a motor vehicle in order to mitigate the results of any
accident, including all necessary buckles and other fasteners, and all hardware designed for
installing such seat belt assembly in a motor vehicle." Id. § 571.209 S3. The rule does not
specify airbags. Manufacturers prefer-and are more likely to install-detachable automatic
seat belts in order to comply with the standard. SENATE STUDY, supra note 6, at 98.
49. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S5.1. (1985).
50. Id. § 571.208 S4.1.2.2.
51. Id. § 571.208 S4.1.2.3.
52. Id. § 517.208 S4.1.3.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 571.208 S4.1.5. In order to influence the secretary's determination, mandatory
seat belt laws must meet these minimum criteria:
1986]
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that seat belt laws apply to at least two-thirds of the country's to-
tal population, then manufacturers may again equip cars according
to any of the three options.55
Whether Florida should attempt to undermine the passive re-
straint requirements was the subject of much debate in the legisla-
ture. Many supporters of the seat belt law wanted mandatory pas-
sive restraint requirements as well; they argued that the FSBL
should not comply with the federal guidelines. They emphasized
the exemptions and the absence of a harsh penalty for noncompli-
ance-factors which made the measure seem less stringent and
therefore more palatable. Critics favored conformity with the fed-
eral criteria, hoping to reduce the possibility of mandatory airbags.
Paradoxically, they argued for more restrictive provisions.
II. FOREGROUND: THE NEW LAW IN A NUTSHELL
The FSBL requires that every operator of a motor vehicle in
Florida be "restricted by an appropriately adjusted safety belt
which is properly fastened at all times when [the vehicle] is in mo-
tion.""6 Also, the driver must make certain that each front seat
passenger less than sixteen years of age is restrained by a safety
belt or child restraint device. 57 Failure to comply with these re-
quirements is unlawful, but noncompliance may not be considered
negligence per se nor used as prima facie evidence of negligence in
any civil action.58 Front-seat passengers sixteen years or older also
(a) Require that each front seat occupant of a passenger car equipped with
safety belts under Standard No. 208 has a safety belt properly fastened about his
or her body at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion.
(b) If waivers from the safety belt usage requirements are to be provided, per-
mit them for medical reasons only.
(c) Provide for the following enforcement measures:(1) A penalty of notoless than $25.00 (which may include court costs) for
each occupant of a car who violates the seat belt usage requirement.
(2) A provision specifying that the violation of the seat belt usage re-
quirement may be used to mitigate damages with respect to any person who
is involved in a passenger car accident while violating the belt usage re-
quirement and who seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover damages
for injuries resulting from the accident. This requirement is satisfied if
there is a rule of law in the State permitting such mitigation.
(3) A program to encourage compliance with the belt usage requirement.
(d) An effective date of not later than September 1, 1989.
Id. § 571.208 S4.1.5.2.
55. Id. § 571.208 S4.1.5.1.
56. Ch. 86-49, § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 173, 174 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(3)(c)).
57. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(4)(a)).
58. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(10)).
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must buckle up;5" they may be penalized for not doing so. Violators
face a twenty-dollar fine for each offense.20 Law enforcement of-
ficers, however, may only enforce the seat belt statute as a second-
ary action-when they suspect the driver has committed a separate
infraction which justifies detention. This restriction prevents police
from pulling over unrestrained but otherwise innocent motorists.6
To inform the public of the new law, police may stop and ver-
bally warn persons not in compliance with the FSBL during a
grace period extending from July 1, 1986, to December 31, 1986;
officers may start issuing citations on January 1, 1987.62 In addi-
tion, the legislature, recognizing that failure to use seat belts con-
tributes to fatalities and injuries, authorized all police departments
and public school systems to "conduct a continuing safety aware-
ness campaign as to the magnitude of the problem and adopt pro-
grams designed to encourage compliance with [the FSBL]."63
Not all vehicles are subject to the FSBL mandates. The follow-
ing are exempt: school buses and buses used for commercial pur-
poses, farm tractors and other implements of husbandry, large
trucks of a net weight exceeding 5,000 pounds, motorcycles,
mopeds, and bicycles.6 4 Newspaper carriers are not required to
wear safety belts while delivering papers, nor are persons "certified
by a physician as having a medical condition that causes the use of
the safety belt to be inappropriate or dangerous" required to
buckle up.65 Also, the only passengers in the front seat of a pickup
truck required to buckle up are those for whom the manufacturer
has provided a seat belt; passengers without safety belts have no
obligation to wear them.6 Despite reports to the contrary, 7 per-
sons delivering mail are not expressly excused.
59. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(5)).
60. Id. § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws at 175 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 318.18(9)).
61. Id. § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws at 174 (to be codified at FL% STAT. § 316.614(9)).
62. Id, (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(7)(a)-(b)).
63. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(8)). The legislature said the FSBL would
be compatible with the continued support by the state for federal safety standards
requiring automatic crash protection, and the enactment of this section should not
be used in any manner to rescind or delay the implementation of the federal auto-
matic crash protection system requirements of Federal Motor Safety Standard 208
as set forth in S.4.1.2.1 thereof, as entered on July 17, 1984 ..
Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(2)).
64. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(3)(a)1.-5.).
65. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(6)(a)).
66. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613(6)(b)).
67. Postal Service letter carriers have been inaccurately identified as exempt from the
seat belt law. Come July 1 it's buckle up or break law, St. Petersburg Times, June 4, 1986,
at Al, col. 3. Sen. George Stuart, Dem., Orlando, made the same mistake when describing
1986]
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III. THE MAKING OF THE FSBL
The seat belt proposal received early attention in both houses.
Representatives Fred Lippman 8 and Thomas Drage69 prefiled
House Bill 40. Senate Bill 210, containing the Senate's version of
the FSBL, was prefiled by Senators George Stuart7 ° and Edgar
Dunn.71
The FSBL cleared its first important hurdle in the Senate Com-
merce Committee. 72 The Senate bill did not exclude from the defi-
nition of "motor vehicle" commercial buses, motorcycles, mopeds,
and bicycles. 73 The bill did not exempt newspaper carriers from
wearing seat belts, nor did it limit the number of passengers riding
in the front seat of a pickup truck required to buckle up. Finally,
the Senate bill did not require that the law be enforced only as a
secondary action, and it was silent on the seat belt defense issue.
The Senate Commerce Committee exempted newspaper carriers
from buckling up while tossing papers74 and passed the bill. 7"
While Senate Bill 210 languished in Appropriations, the House
Transportation Committee subreferred House Bill 40 to the Sub-
committee on Transportation Safety and Motor Vehicles. 7 House
Bill 40 proposed a seat belt statute which would have allowed ex-
emptions for medical purposes only, and would have precluded
consideration of seat belt nonuse as a factor in the mitigation of
damages.77 The Subcommittee revised the House bill to conform to
Senate Bill 210, but it also expressly exempted commercial buses,
the bill before the Senate. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5. An earlier version of the bill
provided such an exemption for rural letter carriers. Fla. HB 37 (1985); see also Fla. SB 144
(1985) (proposing similar exception).
68. Dem., Hollywood.
69. Repub., Orlando.
70. Dem., Orlando.
71. Dem., Ormond Beach, 1974-1986.
72. FLA. LEGIs., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS, at 58, SB 210.
73. Fla. SB 210 (1986).
74. Fla. S., Comm. on Com., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 17, 1986) (on file with
committee) (amendment 2 to SB 210) [hereinafter cited as S. Comm. Tape].
75. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS, at 58, SB 210.
76. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS, at 205, HB 40.
77. Fla. HB 40 (1986).
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mopeds, motorcycles, and bicycles. 78 The bill passed as a commit-
tee substitute.1 9
Two important amendments were added by the House Trans-
portation Committee. 0 One stipulated that a vehicle may not be
stopped solely to enforce the seat belt law, a provision designed to
alleviate fear that the police might enforce the FSBL arbitrarily.
Also adopted was the limited pickup truck exemption, excusing
passengers for whom seat belts are unavailable. This amendment
reflected a concern that some passengers-especially children in
large, rural families-would opt to ride in a truck's bed rather than
break the law and ride in the cab.
Committee Substitute for House Bill 40 underwent one last
change on the floor. The members added a provision specifying
that a violation of the Act shall not constitute negligence per se
nor be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence.81 Five days
later, the bill passed the House.82
Having gained momentum in the House, the measure was ready
to roll through the Senate. Many senators, however, wanted to put
on the brakes; the floor fight proved long and exhaustive. At the
outset, the Senate adopted nine noncontroversial amendments
which conformed the Senate bill to the House version.83 Commit-
tee Substitute for House Bill 40 was then brought up in place of
the Senate bill. After a series of amendments was considered and
rejected, the bill passed. 4 Governor Graham signed it into law on
June 2, 1986.85
IV. ISSUES AND INSIGHT
Three difficult and divisive issues shaped the FSBL: the seat
belt defense, the federal minimum criteria, and school buses.
Highly controversial, each issue threatened to stall the bill's
progress.
78. Fla. CS for HB 40 (1986).
79. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS, at 205, HB 40.
80. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Transp., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 28, 1986) (on file
with committee) (amendments by Reps. Gibbons and Bo Johnson to CS for HB 40) [herein-
after cited as H.R. Transp. Tape].
81. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 413 (Reg. Sess. May 14, 1986).
82. Id. at 435 (Reg. Sess. May 19, 1986).
83. Compare Fla. SB 210 (1986) with Fla. CS for HB 40 (1986).
84. FLA. S. JoUR. 423 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986).
85. Ch. 86-49, 1986 Fla. Laws 173.
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A. Comparative Negligence Versus Mitigation of Damages: The
Seat Belt Defense on Trial
The Senate Commerce Committee and the House Subcommittee
on Transportation Safety and Motor Vehicles grappled with what
changes, if any, the statute should work on Pasakarnis. One propo-
sal considered was that by Senator Langley."
Senator Langley's amendment provided that if a plaintiff were
not at fault in causing the accident, then evidence of his failure to
use a seat belt would not be admissible at trial to mitigate dam-
ages.8 7 Senator Roberta Fox88 argued against the Langley amend-
ment. She hypothesized: If "Unbuckled" is stopped at a stop sign
and is hit from behind by "Negligent," causing Unbuckled serious
injury, Unbuckled could sue Negligent and fully recover. The seat
belt defense would be unavailable because Unbuckled was not at
fault in cahsing the accident. Senator Fox argued that Unbuckled
caused the damage as much as the collision did because Unbuckled
was not wearing the safety belt. Senator Stuart89 retorted that a
person hit from the rear has in no way caused the accident, other
than being unluckily situated.90  Senator Fox remained
unpersuaded.
The insurance industry opposed the Langley amendment. A
spokesman contended that the proposed amendment contravened
both the basis of the seat belt measure, which is to create a legal
duty to wear a safety belt, and its objective to prevent injury. Pro-
moting that objective, he noted, is the Pasakarnis holding. The in-
dustry's representative contended that if the amendment passed
"people would have less incentive to wear a seat belt than they do
right now."9 1
A representative for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers of-
fered a contrary viewpoint. Describing Pasakarnis as a "post-acci-
dent, post-injury seat belt law," he denounced the decision as one
of which the public generally is not aware until after an accident
and injury. Injured motorists then find that damages are reduced
because they failed to wear a seat belt.2 The trial bar argued that
even with the amendment the bill would create a legal duty to
86. Repub., Clermont.
87. S. Comm. Tape, supra note 74 (amendment 2 to SB 210 (1986)).
88. Dem., Coral Gables, 1982-1986.
89. Dem., Orlando.
90. S. Comm. Tape, supra note 74.
91. Id. (remarks of Vincent Rio, Esq.).
92. S. Comm. Tape, supra note 74 (remarks of Eric Tilton, Esq.).
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wear a safety belt. Moreover, a violation of that duty would be evi-
dence of comparative negligence. Therefore, the trial lawyer's rep-
resentative believed the incentive to buckle up would remain pow-
erful, thus serving the bill's stated objective-the prevention of
injuries.93 He reminded the committee, however, that "there is a
difference" between the issues of comparative negligence and the
mitigation of damages.""
The Langley amendment failed. Ironically, this attempt to make
the statute more fair would have made it less so. The amendment
would have partially overruled Pasakarnis. While fault-free plain-
tiffs would have avoided the seat belt defense, others partially at
93. The incentive to buckle up would have been less powerful with the Langley amend-
ment. The situation to which the Langley amendment would have applied-involving a
completely faultless plaintiff-presupposes that the failure to wear a seat belt was not a
cause of the accident. In such a situation the statutory violation would not be admissible as
evidence bearing on comparative negligence, nor would it have been admissible under the
Langley amendment on the issue of mitigation of damages. In short, the Langley amend-
ment would have diluted the incentive to buckle up by creating immunity for fault-free
plaintiffs.
94. S. Comm. Tape, supra note 74. The difference is subtle. "[T]he doctrine of compara-
tive negligence . . . involves apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contributed
[to] the occurrence [of the accident]." Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973). As
such, comparative negligence contemplates the plaintiff's conduct before any damage occurs.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 423 (4th ed. 1971). Mitigation of damages, in this
context a synonym for the seat belt defense, refers not only to the process by which a plain-
tiff may be penalized for not using a seat belt, but also alludes to plaintiff's duty to mitigate
damages under the rule of avoidable consequences-a concept integral to the seat belt de-
fense. Coming "into play after a legal wrong has occurred, but while some damage may still
be averted, [the doctrine of avoidable consequences] bars recovery only for such damages."
Id. (footnote omitted). Both contributory negligence and avoidable consequences "rest upon
the same fundamental policy of making recovery depend upon the plaintiff's proper care for
the protection of his own interests, and both require of him only the standard of the reason-
able man under the circumstances." Id. (footnote omitted). Pre-accident conduct usually
does not contribute to the occurrence of the accident (and hence is not "fault") but may
avert some damages. The New York Court of Appeals explained,
We concede that the opportunity to mitigate damages prior to the occurrence of
an accident does not ordinarily arise, and that the chronological distinction, on
which the concept of mitigation [of] damages rests, is justified in most cases. How-
ever, in our opinion, the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an unusual and
ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may minimize his or her damages
prior to the accident.
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 1974). The Florida Supreme Court approved this
rationale when it recognized the seat belt defense. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984). In
Florida, unlike New York-which at the time Spier was decided had not yet adopted com-
parative negligence-the philosophy of individual responsibility underlying the doctrine of
comparative negligence also helped legitimize the seat belt defense. This confirms Professor
Schwartz's view that "[wihen a state has a general system of comparative negligence, appor-
tioning damages is much easier in the seat-belt cases because the courts are accustomed to
dealing with damage apportionment between negligent plaintiffs and defendants." V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 4.6, at 97 (1974).
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fault would not. In Senator Fox's hypothetical, it was easy to sym-
pathize with Unbuckled and difficult to see why Unbuckled's dam-
ages should be reduced for failing to buckle up. Were this the only
scenario, the Langley amendment might have passed. But adding
another driver to the hypothetical exposes the amendment's weak-
ness. Suppose that upon impact Negligent nudges Unbuckled into
the path of a third motorist, "Slightly Speeding." In the ensuing
lawsuit, the jury apportions ninety-five percent of the fault to Neg-
ligent and five percent to Slightly Speeding. Slightly Speeding,
who was also unbuckled, suffers a significant reduction in damages
for failing to wear his seat belt. It is inequitable that the two plain-
tiffs, Unbuckled and Slightly Speeding, would be treated differ-
ently when both failed to buckle up. Negligent would receive a
windfall because Slightly Speeding was partially at fault.
As this hypothetical illustrates, the Langley amendment would
have illogically immunized fault-free plaintiffs from the
Pasakarnis rule. When an award is reduced because the plaintiff
failed to wear a seat belt, it is not because such failure caused the
accident but because it exacerbated the plaintiff's injuries. A plain-
tiff's comparative negligence does not make his failure to wear a
seat belt any more blameworthy, nor does a lack of comparative
negligence make nonuse reasonable. Fortunately, the Senate Com-
merce Committee did not adopt the Langley amendment.
The House Subcommittee also wrestled with issues surrounding
the seat belt defense, focusing on whether the failure to buckle up
should be considered comparative negligence or continue to be re-
garded as a separate factor for which damages may be mitigated.
The Subcommittee considered an amendment by Representative
Morse"5 which would have permitted proof of seat belt nonuse to
be admitted as evidence of comparative negligence if the plaintiff's
damages were caused by his failure to buckle up. The amendment
would have precluded consideration of this evidence as relevant to
the mitigation of damages.96
Representative Morse argued that this provision would preclude
a double reduction in a plaintiff's damages, referring to the two-
part Pasakarnis process by which an award is first reduced by the
percentage of comparative negligence, if any, and then further re-
95. Repub., Miami.
96. This amendment was identical to a provision which had appeared in HB 40 (1986)
and CS for HB's 37, 47 & 70 (1985).
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duced for failure to mitigate damages by wearing a seat belt.97
However, Representative Drage said some interest groups and leg-
islators believed the better course was to let the courts decide the
issue.98 The amendment almost certainly would have abrogated the
seat belt defense; however, being evenhanded in its application, the
amendment was a more reasonable alternative to existing law than
was Senator Langley's proposal. In any event, the Subcommittee
rejected it."9
Interestingly, advocates of the Morse amendment did not de-
scribe the measure as one calculated to overrule Pasakarnis by
abolishing the seat belt defense. Instead they framed the issue in
terms of "fairness," emphasizing the double reduction of a plain-
tiff's award when the seat belt defense is successful. 00 Virtually
ignored was the fact that the deductions are for two distinct ac-
tions which usually are mutually exclusive. Though antagonistic
toward the seat belt defense, the proponents of the Morse amend-
ment explained that the failure to buckle up would still be admis-
sible as evidence of comparative negligence,' implying that the
award could be reduced for such failure.
It would be conceptually awkward and unfair to combine the
plaintiff's percentage of comparative fault with the percentage by
which his damages were increased by his failure to wear a seat belt.
Such an approach might be feasible in a simple case absent a coun-
terclaim, but when the defendent is also a claimant, the apportion-
ment of comparative fault affects the liability of each party to the
other. 0 12 In only a few instances will a plaintiff's failure to buckle
up put him at fault in the accident and contribute to the defend-
ant's injuries.'03 That failure, therefore, should not expose the
97. Rep. Morse's beliefs were influenced by critics of the double reduction. One critic
said most trial lawyers argue that a plaintiff suffers a reduction in damages twice due to his
failure to wear a seat belt-once from comparative negligence, then from mitigation of dam-
ages. Fla. H.R., Subcomm. on Transp. & Motor Vehicles, tape recording of proceedings
(Apr. 23, 1986) (on file with committee) (remarks of Eric Tilton, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. Transp. Subcomm. Tape].
98. Id. Informing the Subcommittee how the amendment would change the existing law,
Rep. Drage said, "Not wearing seat belts would be taken into consideration as part of the
comparative negligence [equation] and there would only be one determination at that time
." Id.
99. H.R. Transp. Subcomm. Tape, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973); see supra note 34.
103. As the Pasakarnis court realized, "[a] different situation would be presented if the
defendant alleged and proved that the plaintiff's negligent failure to wear a seat belt was a
contributing cause of the accident." In that event, evidence of seat belt nonuse would be
19861
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plaintiff to greater liability for the defendant's damages in a coun-
terclaim. Further, it is doubtful whether the failure to wear a seat
belt can be fairly compared with comparative negligence. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal illustrated this point dramatically
in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co: 04
We . . .have great difficulty comparing the negligence of fail-
ing to buckle up with the negligence of causing an accident. The
unbuckled plaintiff's conduct seems mild and acceptable while
sitting innocently at a stoplight when contrasted with a hypothet-
ical speeding and intoxicated driver who is 100% at fault in the
resulting rear end collision. 10 5
Thus examined, the contention that the seat belt defense would
survive as a form of comparative negligence seems obfuscatory.
Courts, unable to apply the seat belt defense consistently, might
well have abandoned it.
To be sure, the approach approved by the Senate Commerce
Committee and the House committees-legislative silence regard-
ing the seat belt defense-would also have had ramifications not
readily apparent to the committees. Had the legislature remained
silent on this issue, it would have rendered an implicit statement
about the standard of care expected of reasonably prudent persons.
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of the statute would most
likely have been found unreasonable per se,101 a strict rule rejected
admissible as to the liability. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454 n.3. Apparently confronting that
situation, a New York court commented:
Of course, if the jury determines that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was
contributory negligence then . .. it must consider such failure in apportioning
liability. However, that conduct may not again be considered in mitigation of
damages. This would amount to a double reduction of plaintiffs damages based
upon the same conduct, which would be entirely inappropriate.
Curry v. Moser, 454 N.Y.S.2d 311, 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). This seems a sensible ap-
proach to such a situation, one that should be followed by Florida courts.
104. 425 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
105. Id. at 1151.
106. If a statute "establishes a duty to take precautions to protect a particular class of
persons from a particular injury or type of injury," then the violation of that statute is
negligence per se. DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973)
(citation omitted). For the statutory violation to constitute actionable negligence, a plaintiff
must establish that "he is of a class the statute was intended to protect, that he suffered
injury of the type the statute was designed to prevent, and that the violation of the statute
was a proximate cause of his injury." Id. at 201. This "established law applies with equal
force" to a defendant who asserts a comparative negligence defense. Rex Utils., Inc. v.
Gaddy, 413 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (citation omitted). Presumably, it also
would have applied to a defendant raising the affirmative seat belt defense, because one of
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in Pasakarnis. Though less likely, seat belt nonuse could have
been pronounced prima facie unreasonable."0 7 Either way, the
FSBL would have changed the existing law by lifting from the de-
fendant the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's failure to wear
a seat belt was unreasonable under the circumstances, making it
much easier to prevail with the seat belt defense.
The Renke amendment resolved the issue.08 Representative
Renke °9 urged that without his amendment the measure would
change Florida's law with respect to automobile accidents. 10 Rep-
resentative Woodruff'1 ' concurred: "All this amendment does is
keep the law in regard to the evidence of seat belts in cases exactly
the way it is, rather than expanding it which we didn't intend to
do ....
This point was reiterated by Representative Simon, 1 3 who ex-
plained that the amendment ensured that the burden of proof in
negligence actions with respect to the unreasonableness of the
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt would remain on the defend-
ant. Instead of being negligence per se or prima facie evidence of
negligence, a statutory violation will simply be some evidence of
the elements it shares with comparative negligence is that the defendant must demonstrate
that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care under the circumstances. Because of this
overlap between the two defenses, it would not be necessary to label the seat belt defense
comparative negligence to admit evidence of violation of the statute. The statute would sim-
ply have established as a matter of law the standard of reasonable care, relieving the de-
fendant of the burden of showing that the plaintiff's nonuse was unreasonable. The defend-
ant would still have had to prove causation, of course.
107. When a statutory violation is not negligence per se, it may be considered prima
facie evidence of negligence. This is also the rule regarding violations of traffic regulations,
which are distinguished from other penal statutes. DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.,
281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973). Although the FSBL is a traffic safety regulation, violation
would probably be found unreasonable per se. An analogous law is FLA. STAT. § 316.211(1)
(1985), requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. Although it is a traffic safety regulation, its
violation constitutes negligence per se. Rex Utils., Inc. v. Gaddy, 413 So. 2d, 1233, 1234 (Fla.
3d DCA 1982). In Gaddy, a pre-Pasakarnis decision, the court considered whether the
plaintiff's failure to wear headgear-a statutory violation-was comparative negligence. The
court rejected the defense because the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiff's fail-
ure to wear headgear was a proximate cause of her injuries. Id. Even if a violation of the law
could have been considered prima facie evidence of a failure to exercise due care, that pre-
sumption could have been overcome by other facts and circumstances. Clark v. Sumner, 72
So. 2d 375, 378 (Fla. 1954).
108. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
109. Repub., New Port Richey.
110. Fla. H.R., tape recording of proceedings (May 14, 1986) (on file with Clerk) [herein-
after cited as May 14 House Debate].
111. Repub., St. Petersburg.
112. May 14 House Debate, supra note 110.
113. Dem., Miami.
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negligence to be considered with all the facts of the case." 4 To pre-
vent any misunderstanding, Representative Renke later read a
statement of legislative intent making it clear that the amendment
was not designed to alter the Pasakarnis rule regarding mitigation
of damages. Rather, it was designed to ensure that a violation of
the seat belt law alone would not amount to negligence per se or
prima facie evidence of negligence "for any comparative negligence
purposes." 11 5 Though there was lingering concern that the failure
to wear seat belts would be deemed comparative negligence, it
would have been neither necessary nor desirable to convert the
seat belt defense into comparative negligence. 1
Because the legislature was unwilling to overrule Pasakarnis and
abolish the seat belt defense, the approach agreed upon was sensi-
ble. The legislature confirmed the wisdom of the "very practical
viewpoint" that
the failure to expend the minimal effort required to fasten an
available safety device which has been put there specifically in
order to reduce or avoid injuries from a subsequent accident is,
on the very face of the matter, obviously pertinent and thus
should be deemed admissible in an action for damages, part of
which would have been sustained if the seat belt had not been
used. 7
By refraining from imposing an inflexible standard of care, the leg-
islature acknowledged that most people do not usually use their
seat belts-an indication that reasonable care does not require
buckling up. Because some people believe seat belts cause injuries
in some circumstances, juries may find the decision to forego using
them a reasonable one."18 The seat belt defense survived a severe
trial. It will remain in the law unchanged.
B. The Federal Rule
A question that came up continually in both houses was whether
the bill should conform to the federal rule's minimum criteria for
state mandatory safety belt laws. The issue dominated the House
114. May 14 House Debate, supra note 110.
115. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 435 (Reg. Sess. May 19, 1986) (statement of intent).
116. See supra note 94.
117. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
(Schwartz, J., dissenting), quoted with approval in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis,
451 So. 2d 447, 453 (Fla. 1984).
118. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d at 1146.
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Transportation Committee's discussion. Representative Arm-
strong" 9 introduced two amendments intended to bring the bill
into compliance with the minimum criteria. He argued that any
seat belt law should conform to federal guidelines, thus making the
Florida law a vote to veto federal rules mandating automatic re-
straint systems. Otherwise, he said, "this bill will . . . mandate the
use of airbags. "120
The first Armstrong amendment, a proposal which would have
deleted the exemption granted newspaper carriers, initially
passed. 2 ' But Representative Gibbons 122 moved to reconsider. 123
Representative Lippman, concerned that the amendment would
slow the bill's progress through the legislature, urged members to
vote against the amendment. Representative Drage was concerned
that the committee did not understand that the amendment re-
moved an exemption. Upon reconsideration the amendment
failed. 24 Representative Armstrong then withdrew his second
amendment, which would have increased the penalty to twenty-
five dollars.' 28 This amendment alone could not have conformed
the bill to federal criteria. The committee's turnabout on this
amendment exemplifies the confusion that surrounded the issue.
Some legislators believed the measure conformed too closely to
the federal minimum criteria, threatening to undermine the federal
government's mandate to the manufacturers to install passive re-
straints. On the floor, Representative Deutsch'2 6 proposed an
amendment to repeal the measure automatically "immediately
upon the date that the Secretary of the United States Department
of Transportation determines to rescind the portion of the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208. . . which requires the instal-
lation of automatic restraints. 1 27 He argued that the bill, though
in "technical" noncompliance with the federal rule, was not in "le-
119. Dem., Plantation.
120. H.R. Transp. Tape, supra note 80.
121. Id.
122. Dem., Tampa, 1984-1986.
123. H.R. Transp. Tape, supra note 80.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Dem., Tamarac.
127. FLA. H.R. JouR. 413 (Reg. Sess. May 14, 1986) (amendment 1 to HB 40). The
amendment also provided that the seat belt law would not be automatically repealed if the
secretary of transportation's decision to rescind the passive restraint requirements were not
based on the enactment of seat belt laws. Id.; cf. CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315 (West Supp. 1986)
(sunset provision).
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gal" noncompliance' 2 8 and could therefore be used to invalidate
the federal passive restraint requirements-ultimately resulting in
decreased protection for those who refused to wear safety belts.'29
Rejecting this gloomy forecast, the House tabled the amendment.
In the Senate a similar proposal was made by Senator Ger-
sten, 130 and his arguments resembled those of Representative
Deutsch.' 3' Reminding his colleagues that the House was likely to
reject last-minute changes, Senator Stuart reassured the Senate
that the bill was "carefully crafted" to fall short of the federal cri-
teria, and that it did not comply with them. 32 He insisted that a
sunset provision was unnecessary.133 Senator Scott3 4 wanted to
know "why [are we] not making this law so that you don't have to
have one of those expensive airbags'38 if you have seat belts in your
car?"'3 6 Senator Stuart limited the issue: "I do not believe we
ought to make a decision on airbags. That is a decision left to the
federal government, because it's a manufacturing issue [affecting]
the whole country."' 37 Senator Gersten, however, would not con-
cede that the Florida measure was deficient enough to avoid influ-
encing the secretary's decision regarding the repeal of the auto-
matic restraint requirements. Nevertheless, the amendment
failed.3 8
128. May 14 House Debate, supra note 110.
129. Rep. Deutsch predicted that no more than 40% of Florida's population would com-
ply with the law. Therefore, he said that if the secretary were to repeal the federal passive
restraint requirements, the majority of motorists would continue to travel unprotected. If
the FSBL were used to rescind the federal requirements, the law would harm rather than
protect Florida motorists. Id.
130. Dem., South Miami, 1981-1986.
131. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5.
132. In addition to the intent language, see supra note 63, the FSBL by design fails to
meet the minimum criteria in two ways: (1) the penalty, $20, is less than the $25 fine de-
manded by the federal standard, and (2) the FSBL offers more exemptions than the federal
regulation allows.
133. Sen. Stuart also averred that none of the 25 states that previously passed
mandatory seat belt laws had conformed their statutes to the federal minimum criteria. All
these laws, he claimed, are deficient in some way. Therefore, he argued that the FSBL
would be irrelevant to the decision regarding the fate of the federal requirements.
134. Repub., Ft. Lauderdale.
135. The major American automobile manufacturers have estimated that airbags will
cost consumers in excess of $800 per car. 49 Fed. Reg. 28969 (1984). Automatic seat belts by
contrast, are much less expensive. General Motors says it can add automatic seat belts for
an additional $45, Chrysler claims it would cost $115, Honda pushes the price to $150, and
Nissan and Renault estimate it will cost $200 or more.
136. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5.
137. Id.
138. FLA. S. JOUR. 422 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986) (amendment 2 to CS for HB 40).
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C. School Bus Safety
Perhaps the problem most agonized over was the school bus is-
sue. The seat belt law could have required children on school buses
to wear seat belts. This sounds reasonable until the enormous ex-
pense is considered; in 1985 the Department of Education esti-
mated that equipping Florida's school buses with seat belts would
cost $30 million.13 Requiring school buses to be equipped with
safety belts would have forced the bill back into Appropriations
where, because of the costs, the bill would have died. Representa-
tive Shackleford 140 introduced such an amendment anyway, insist-
ing it was not a ploy to kill the bill. "I don't know what the cost
is," he confessed, but "I don't know what a life is worth. '14' Argu-
ing against the proposal, Representative Kimme' 42 cited studies
suggesting that seat belts were inappropriate in school buses.143 He
said the best way to save school children's lives would be to turn
bus seats backwards.1 44
Though the House defeated the school bus amendment, it reap-
peared in the Senate. Senator Don Childers 4 reduced the complex
issue to a simple test: "[I]f we're really concerned about the safety
of the people of the state of Florida, you'll support this amend-
ment; if we're not concerned about the safety of the people of the
state of Florida, you'll oppose this amendment.1' 46 This challenge
left the bill's supporters in a dilemma. Senator Dunn acknowl-
edged the problem of school bus safety but was mindful of the high
cost involved in requiring school bus seat belts. Dunn pointed out
that adopting the amendment would consign the seat belt bill to
Appropriations and, presumably, oblivion.147 This, he noted, was
paradoxical: "[It would] kill this bill because of our desire to
broaden the scope of its effect.' 48
139. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 144 (1985) Staff Analysis 2 (rev. Apr. 25, 1985)
(on file with committee).
140. Dem., Palmetto.
141. May 14 House Debate, supra note 110.
142. Repub., West Palm Beach., 1980-1982, 1984-1986.
143. Rep. Kimmel claimed that crash studies by Transport Canada showed "that be-
cause the belt holds [children) in place," their heads hit the seats in front upon collision.
May 14 House Debate, supra note 110.
144. Id.
145. Dem., West Palm Beach.
146. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The school bus amendment presented opponents the delightful
opportunity to scuttle the seat belt bill yet trumpet sincere con-
cern for safety. Senator Myers ' 9 stated that if the reason for refus-
ing to require school bus passengers to buckle up was strictly eco-
nomics, "that's a sad statement on the policy of the legislature,
and I think you ought to vote for this amendment." 150 Another
senator added that if seat belts were good in cars, they would even
better in school buses.""' The school bus amendment met with de-
feat;" 2 however, the issue seems likely to reappear.'8 '
V. A PERPLEXING PROBLEM AND A SIMPLE SOLUTION
While the FSBL was stirring up controversy, the child restraint
law was quietly amended. Appearing in both the Senate and House
bills,"' the amendments to the child restraint law breezed through
the committees and ended up intact in the Committee Substitute
for House Bill 40. As amended, the statute now requires that every
operator of a motor vehicle properly secure any passenger five
years old or younger. 5' Tourists and babysitters now must obey
the child restraint law, and those charged with its violation will no
longer be able to avoid paying the fine by proving that a child re-
straint device was purchased later. That defense has been de-
leted." Like the FSBL, the child restraint law now affects anyone
who drives in this state; however-and it is imprecise on this
point-the FSBL apparently does not overlap the child restraint
law's provisions, allowing that older statute to control in the situa-
tions to which it applies."57 Thus, under the child restraint law,
149. Repub., Hobe Sound.
150. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5.
151. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5 (remarks by Sen. Deratany).
152. FLA. S. JOUR. 422-23 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986) (amendment 4 to CS for HB 40).
153. New York, the first state to pass a mandatory seat belt law, is again in the van-
guard. On August 14, 1986, Gov. Mario Cuomo of New York signed into law a bill requiring
that all new school buses delivered to that state be equipped with seat belts and extra pad-
ding on the tops and back of passenger seats. Under the law, which takes effect July 1, 1987,
up to 90% of the cost-about $1,500 per bus-will be paid by the state. Whether old buses
should be modified has been left to local school boards. New York's law does not require
that students use the safety belts, and it immunizes school districts and drivers from liabil-
ity if children are injured while unbuckled. Bill on Seat Belts Signed by Cuomo, New York
Times, Aug. 15, 1986, at A10, col. 1.
154. Compare Fla. SB 210 (1986) with Fla. CS for HB 40 (1986).
155. Ch. 86-49, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 173 (amending FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)-(4) (1985), to
be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)-(3)).
156. Id.
157. According to the FSBL, "[iut is unlawful for any person ... [t]o operate a motor
vehicle in this state unless each front seat passenger under the age of 16 years is restrained
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when children less than six years old travel they must be secured
regardless of where they sit within the vehicle. By contrast, the
FSBL requires operators to make sure that children less than six-
teen years old are restrained-but only when they ride in the front
seat. Drivers, then, have a more stringent obligation to protect
children less than six years of age because they must be properly
restrained whether seated in the front or the back of the vehicle.
There is a disparity between the statutes, however, which creates
a dilemma. A provision of the child restraint law, untouched by
recent amendments, states: "The failure to provide and use a child
passenger restraint shall not be considered comparative negligence,
nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any
civil action with regard to negligence."15 This shield insulates
drivers from civil liability for failing to secure young passengers as
required. Because the legislature did not want the FSBL to under-
mine Pasakarnis or sandbag the seat belt defense, the FSBL does
not by its terms prohibit introducing evidence of an operator's fail-
ure to follow the statute's imperatives.1 59 While the admissibility of
evidence regarding an individual's failure to secure himself is not
in doubt, the child restraint law confuses the issue as to whether
evidence of an operator's failure to secure a young front seat pas-
senger-even a child over five years old-is admissible. Consider
that under the child restraint law, as explained by Justice Shaw in
his dissent in Pasakarnis,
a parent who has failed to secure a child in the restraint device
can, nonetheless, sue for the wrongful death of the child caused
by the negligent driving of the defendant, and the defendant can-
not introduce evidence that the parent had not secured the child
by a safety belt or by a child restraint device pursuant to s. 316.613, if applicable." Ch. 86-
49, § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 174 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(4)(a)). Which statute does
the operator violate if he transports an unrestrained front seat passenger five years old or
younger? Is it the child restraint law, the FSBL, or both? Surely it is the child restraint law
only, if the measure's history is any indication. In an earlier version of the FSBL, Fla. HB
40 (1986), the statute specified that "[ejach operator ... shall secure all front seat passen-
gers 16 years of age or younger with a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt, ex-
cept that a child who is 5 years of age or younger shall be protected pursuant to the child
restraint requirements set forth in s. 316.613." The difference between a violation of the
FSBL and the child restraint law is five dollars. The penalty for violation of the FSBL is
$20, Ch. 86-49, § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws 175 (amending FLA. STAT. § 318.18 (1985), to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 318.18(9)), and for a violation of the child restraint law, a $25 fine may be
assessed. FLA. STAT. § 318.18(2) (1985).
158. Ch. 86-49, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 173 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.613(2)).
159. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 435 (Reg. Sess. May 19, 1986) (statement of intent).
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in a restraint device . . . . [A] violation of that duty cannot be
used to reduce damages.' 60
Furthermore, in a suit brought on behalf of an injured child, the
child restraint law effectively bars any recovery from an operator
who, though not at fault in causing the accident, may have contrib-
uted substantially to the infant's injuries by failing properly to re-
strain the child. A claim for contribution filed against an operator
whose failure to provide proper protection aggravated a child's
damages would also be precluded. Now suppose the injured child is
six years old, outside the scope of the child restraint law, yet cov-
ered under the FSBL. The question arises whether the child could
sue an operator who failed to secure him. Courts must also deter-
mine whether a negligent third party can seek contribution against
a driver for failure to secure the child. It is not clear whether the
evidence of such failure must be excluded from the trial of any
civil action pursuant to the exculpatory provision in the child re-
straint law or by analogy to that provision.
It is absurd to have a statutory scheme which prevents a child
five years old or younger from suing an operator in negligence for
the operator's failure to secure the child while permitting a young-
ster more than five years old to sue a driver because of the same
failure. It would be ironic indeed if the children provided "better
protection" under the child restraint law were forced to endure
worse treatment at common law than might otherwise be available.
Conversely, to allow a driver who failed to secure a child to escape
civil liability for that failure due to the fortuity that the victim's
extremely young age implicated the child restraint law rather than
the FSBL would be exceedingly perverse. Indeed, courts cannot
construe the statutes this way. Assuming the legislature does not
act to change this inconsistency, the only reasonable alternative to
the untenable "solution" of excluding claims expressly barred,
while allowing those by claimants not "protected" by the child re-
straint law, is to summarily dismiss any claim founded upon an
operator's failure to secure.
And yet, since 1973 Florida has operated under a comparative
negligence system, 161 and in 1984 the seat belt defense was recog-
nized. 162 Therefore, there is no longer any justification for the ex-
clusion of evidence of an operator's failure properly to secure a
160. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 455 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
161. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
162. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 449.
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child if a causal connection can be established between that failure
and the child's injuries. To acknowledge that failure to fasten one's
own seat belt may be unreasonable conduct for which a mitigation
of damages may be sought, while denying that the failure to secure
a child may likewise constitute unreasonable conduct for which
civil liability might be incurred, is incongruent.
However, when the legislature wrote the immunity provision into
the child restraint law in 1982, the provision was not such a prob-
lem because Florida courts were hostile to the notion that seat belt
nonuse might be used to reduce a plaintiff's award. Subsequently
support for this position eroded.163 The legislature was apparently
unwilling to allow the child restraint law to be a catalyst for a ma-
jor change in the common law, preferring instead to preserve the
status quo with respect to the effect of seat belt nonuse on civil
liability. Despite the legislative damper, the supreme court subse-
quently created the seat belt defense in Pasakarnis. However, Jus-
tice Shaw, citing the child restraint law's immunity provision, ar-
gued against the court's decision. He observed the incongruity
inherent in ruling that an individual owes himself a duty to mini-
mize his personal injuries by buckling up, when the breach of a
statutory duty to secure a child cannot give rise to civil liability.
"It seems to me that there would be a greater duty for a parent to
protect a helpless child, especially when required by law, than to
protect himself."'
Before the legislature amended the child restraint law and
passed the FSBL, this inconsistency, though troublesome, could be
explained. The original child restraint law applied only to parents
and legal guardians transporting their own children. 6 5 Because the
163. In Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court held that the
negligent defendants could not plead entitlement to contribution from the parents of a child
injured in an automobile accident, where the contribution claim was founded on an allega-
tion that the parents had "negligently failed 'to secure, restrain, or otherwise protect the
infant.'" The First District "decline[d] to recognize in the common law (there being no
statutory obligation) an asserted duty of parents, the predicate for a potential contribution
claim, to install child restraint devices in their vehicles." Id. at 351. However, having fore-
closed the claim for lack of duty, the court seemed relieved that it "need not advance the
conventional, if troublesomely unconvincing, arguments against reducing the damages to be
awarded in a comparative negligence state to one whose injury was more serious because he
did not buckle an available seat belt." Id. In addition to that admission, the court that
handed down the venerable Brown decision, see supra note 25, reserved the question
"whether a case for the jury would be presented if the parent present in the car failed to
buckle his child in a restraint device already installed." Id. at 350.
164. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
165. FLA. STAT. § 316.613(1)(a) (1985); see supra note 13.
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statutory duty ran exclusively from parent to child, the immunity
provision fit comfortably within the familiar concept of parental
immunity-a doctrine under which "the law simply [did] not rec-
ognize parental negligence causing injury to the child as an action-
able tort."1 6 It is perhaps no coincidence that just before the pas-
sage of the child restraint law, the Florida Supreme Court carved
out limited exceptions to the aging rule of parental immunity. In
Ard v. Ard,16 7 the supreme court held that in a negligence action
by an unemancipated minor against a parent, the parental immu-
nity doctrine is waived to the extent of the parent's available lia-
bility insurance coverage. And, in Joseph v. Quest,""8 a companion
case to Ard, the court announced that contribution is available
against a parent but is limited to the liability insurance coverage
the parent may have. So, by drafting into the child restraint law a
provision guaranteeing parental immunity from civil liability for
failing to secure their children, the legislature quietly closed the
courtroom door on a potential plethora of intrafamily lawsuits,
lawsuits which were, and remain, a legitimate public policy
concern. 169
The immunity provision was initially a -reasonable device to keep
the child restraint law from becoming a vehicle by which children
could sue their parents. But the revamped child restraint law and
its companion, the FSBL, now create a duty far broader than that
envisioned by the earlier law alone. Because parents are no longer
the sole possible violators-and thus not the only potential defend-
ants in negligence actions founded upon the failure to secure-the
policy considerations cease to be compelling. The nagging inconsis-
tency between Pasakarnis and the child restraint law, once but a
whisper, is now a scream. In addition, the presence of an immunity
166. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 1982) (Boyd, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
167. Id. at 1067.
168. 414 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1982).
169. Even the Ard court conceded that "[p]rotecting the family unit is a significant pub-
lic policy behind parental immunity. We are greatly concerned by any intrusion that might
adversely affect the family relationship. Litigation between family members would be such
an intrusion." Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1067. Nevertheless, the Ard court decided that when insur-
ance is available, the lawsuit between child and parent is actually between child and par-
ent's insurance carrier. Therefore, the suit is "friendly" rather than truly adversary, because
a recovery will not deplete the family's resources but will benefit the family as a whole by
easing financial difficulties arising from the child's injuries. Id. at 1068-69. Justice Boyd
remained skeptical: "Being on opposite sides of a lawsuit puts people in an adversary posi-
tion. . . . [T]he interests of parent and child in such a situation conflict in a very real way."
Id. at 1070 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
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provision in the child restraint law is incompatible with the ab-
sence of one in the FSBL; it threatens to restrict the more permis-
sive law. The current situation demands remedial action.
An unrestrained child injured in an automobile accident should
have a cause of action against the operator who failed to secure
him. If the child is under six years old, defusing the affirmative
seat belt defense, 170 a defendant whose negligence caused the acci-
dent should nevertheless be able to seek contribution from the op-
erator if the operator's failure to fasten the child's seat belt con-
tributed substantially to the child's injuries. It is illogical, and
contrary to the principles of comparative negligence, to require a
negligent defendant in such a case to pay all the child's damages.
After all, if an unrestrained motorist were to pursue an action for
damages, the defendant would not be liable for those injuries sub-
stantially produced by the plaintiff's failure to buckle up. Simi-
larly, a child over five years old might not be able to recover the
portion of his damages caused by his unreasonable failure to wear
a safety belt. 17 Yet the law now recognizes that a child between
the ages of six and fifteen may not always take proper precautions
for his own safety; the law expects another to make sure that a
child in this age group is restrained. Why should a child, whose
recognized need for supervision has prompted legislative action, be
unable to recoup at least a fraction of his otherwise unrecoverable
damages from the one who failed to ensure his safety?
Under the circumstances of a particular case, the failure to se-
cure a child may not constitute negligence. The child's age, for ex-
ample, would be a crucial factor, as might the presence or absence
of other adults in the vehicle. However, when the failure to secure
is unreasonable, that failure should be admissible as evidence of
negligence.
The legislature should act to correct this anomaly. One solution
would be to revise the immunity provision so that failure to pro-
vide and use a child passenger restraint device shall not constitute
170. As "any ... child under six years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable
of committing contributory negligence," Swindell v. Hellkamp, 242 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla.
1970), it follows by analogy that a jury must be precluded from finding the failure to buckle
up by a child in this age group unreasonable under the circumstances.
171. Nothing in Pasakarnis rules out the possibility that a child six years old or older
could have damages reduced for failure to wear a seat belt. The child's age, of course, would
be one of the circumstances of the case, and the younger the child the more difficult it
would be to prove unreasonable behavior. If the defendant could not establish that the
child's behavior was unreasonable under the circumstances, then the situation would resem-
ble that described above. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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negligence per se nor shall such violation be used as prima facie
evidence of negligence in any civil action. 72 This language resolves
the conflict between the child restraint law and the FSBL with re-
spect to civil liability for failure to secure a child and would allow
children to sue operators for this failure. Such an approach would
not create a new, independent statutory cause of action, but
neither would it prevent a common law claim from developing.
Rather than being entitled to recovery as a matter of law upon a
showing of failure to secure, claimants would still have to establish
all elements of actionable negligence. Evidence of the statutory vi-
olation would be admissible as part of the case's attendant
circumstances. 173
For now, however, courts have little choice but to follow the une-
quivocal directive of the child restraint law (presumably applica-
ble, by analogy, to the FSBL as well) to exclude evidence of failure
to secure. This robs children of a reasonable cause of action against
operators who will have not only violated statutes designed to en-
sure their safety, but who may have also failed to exercise the rea-
sonable care required by the circumstances.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Opponents of the FSBL questioned its constitutionality as a
governmental intrusion into matters of personal autonomy. The
outcry over the new law's supposed intrusiveness, however, is best
categorized as hyperbole. The FSBL will probably withstand con-
stitutional challenge.
172. Cf. ch. 86-49, § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 174 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316. 614(10)).
173. With proper limiting instructions, evidence of the violation might be relevant to the
issues of duty and proximate cause, as well as evidence of custom or practice. See Cadillac
Fairview, Inc. v. Cespedes, 468 So. 2d 417, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (contemplating the ad-
missibility into evidence of an employer's violation of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA)). OSHA provides that "[niothing in this chapter shall be construed to super-
sede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or
affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of em-
ployers and employees." 29 U.S.C. § 653(4) (1982). On the duty and proximate cause ques-
tions, evidence of the statutory violation might overcome reluctance similar to that ex-
pressed by the Selfe court. See supra note 163. While that court hesitated to acknowledge a
parental duty to provide child restraint devices, it "[did] not doubt the proposition that the
[parents'] failure to buy, install, and use a child restraint device . . . was arguably among
the causes-in-fact contributing to [their child's] facial injuries." Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d
348, 351 (Fla. 1973) (footnote omitted).
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Because mandatory seat belt use laws are recent phenomena,1 4
there is a paucity of case law on point. Decisions from New York's
lower courts comprise the complete corpus.17 5 People v. Weber,1 7 6
decided in 1985, purports to be the first case to examine the consti-
tutionality of a mandatory seat belt statute. Weber was charged
with violating New York's seat belt law. He contended that the
statute contravened the Constitution as an impermissable exercise
of the state's police power, that its exemptions created classifica-
tions violative of due process and equal protection,' 77 and that it
was vague.'
7 8
The court disagreed. Calling Weber's first objection untenable, it
noted that the police power "extends to any reasonable rule . . .
designed to promote or protect the public's health, safety or
morals.' 79 The court determined that the mere act of fastening a
seat belt is ordinarily not burdensome, especially after it becomes a
habit.80 The court found the statute "a reasonable and constitu-
tional exercise of the State's police power."' 81 It also rejected the
equal protection challenge because it found the exemptions from
the statute reasonable."8 2
174. New York's mandatory seat belt law was the first. It became effective on January 1,
1985. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney Supp. 1986).
175. The Illinois Supreme Court has referred to that state's mandatory seat belt law, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95'/2, § 12-603.1 (Supp. 1985), but has not yet passed on its constitutionality.
Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268, 273 (II. 1985) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
176. 494 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Town Ct. 1985).
177. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. New York law exempts taxis, liveries, tractors, trucks
with a maximum gross weight of 18,000 pounds or more, and buses other than school buses.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c(9) (McKinney Supp. 1986). It also exempts school buses.
Id. However, a new law to take effect in 1987 repeals that exemption. See supra note 153.
178. Weber's void-for-vagueness argument attacked the requirement that the safety
belts used must be approved by the traffic safety commissioner. He argued "that 'an ordi-
nary person has no way of knowing which safety belts are approved by the Commissioner.'"
Weber, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The court rejected this contention, deciding the requirement
gave certainty to the law by providing a process for approval or rejection of specific kinds of
seat belts and precluding jerry-rigged substitutes. Id. at 964.
A similar vagueness argument would be even less effective in Florida because the FSBL
defines safety belt to mean "any seat belt assembly that meets the requirements established
under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. a. 571.208." Ch. 86-49, § 2,
1986 Fla. Laws 174 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 316.614(3)(b)). Because all passenger cars
sold in this country must comply with Standard 208, Florida motorists using factory in-
stalled seat belts can be assured that they are in compliance with the law.
179. Weber, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 962 (emphasis in original).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 964. The exemptions for taxis and, liveries-which are not found in the
FSBL-troubled the court. However, the court concluded that legislators might have ex-
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Lastly, the court concluded that
[n]o one has an inherent right to drive a car. Each one of us can
drive only with a license, granted on condition that he complies
with all reasonable and constitutional statutes for the protection
of the public, including himself. The court finds that the New
York mandatory safety belt law is such a statute, and that it con-
sequently is constitutional.183
The second New York decision regarding that state's seat belt
law is Wells v. State.184 Wells sought a declaratory judgment that
the New York statute was unconstitutional, advancing arguments
similar to those made by Weber185 but also claiming that "the law
'depriv[ed] [him] of his right to make an intelligent decision which
pertain[ed] solely to his person and his personal safety.' "186 Wells'
attempt to rest this right to privacy upon Roe v. Wade1 87 proved
unsuccessful. Flatly rejecting the argument, the court stated:
"One's right to control one's own body, and the government's at-
tempt to interfere with what takes place inside that body, can
hardly be compared with the State's interference with the liberty
of the individual inside his or her automobile." 88
The survival of New York's statute is instructive, but not defini-
tive. Judicial affirmance of Florida law analogous to the FSBL sug-
gests that Florida courts, like New York's, will be supportive of the
new seat belt law. An analogous Florida law is section 316.211,
Florida Statutes, 89 which requires motorcyclists to wear securely
fastened protective headgear. The constitutional issues raised by
mandatory motorcycle helmet legislation are nearly identical to
those posed by the seat belt law, and the Florida Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the helmet law in State v. Eitel.190
In Eitel, the court announced the purpose of the helmet law to
be the preservation of life and the health of a cyclist, 91 an interest
empted these vehicles believing their drivers, if restrained, would be more vulnerable to
armed robbery. Id.
183. Id.
184. 495 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
185. Id. at 592.
186. Id. at 594.
187. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
188. Wells, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
189. FLA. STAT. § 316.211 (1985).
190. 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969).
191. Id. at 490.
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it declared was deeply rooted in organized society. 92 Moreover, it
found the requirement to wear a helmet a minor inconvenience
that the legislature may impose, considering the protection a hel-
met provides against death or serious injury."9 3 As for the right of
the individual to be left alone, the court was similarly direct: "If
[the cyclist] falls, we cannot leave him lying in the road. The legis-
lature may constitutionally conclude that the cyclist's right to be
let alone is no more precious than the corresponding right of am-
bulance drivers, nurses, and neurosurgeons.''19
Surely the same can be said about a motorist's "right" to ride
unrestrained. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that a court which
has recently recognized that merely minimal effort is required to
fasten an available safety device-and has further asserted that
the seat belt is a proven way to minimize injuries before an acci-
dent-would find the seat belt law unconstitutionally intrusive.'95
The FSBL imposes upon Florida motorists no more onerous a duty
than does the Pasakarnis decision; the legislature struggled to cur-
tail the statute's intrusiveness.
One development in Florida law since Eitel offers the basis for a
rejuvenated-though probably unsuccessful-right-to-privacy ar-
gument. In 1980, Florida voters approved the addition of a privacy
provision to the Florida Constitution, guaranteeing every citizen
the "right to be let alone" by the state. 96 Although this right to
privacy is much broader than the piecemeal privacy guarantee rec-
ognized under the United States Constitution,' the supreme
court has held that it does not provide an absolute barrier against
state intrusion into one's private life.' 98 The privacy right must be
assessed in the context in which it is asserted.' 99 Nevertheless, the
supreme court has held that it will apply its most searching scru-
tiny-the compelling state interest test200-when reviewing alleged
192. Id. at 491.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453.
196. FLA. CONST., art. I, § 23.
197. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Reg., 477 So. 2d 544,
548 (Fla. 1985).
198. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1983).
199. Id. For example, because the practice of law is a privilege rather than a constitu-
tional right in Florida, an applicant to the Florida Bar must disclose his entire history of
medical and psychological treatment. Id.
200. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547. In theory, this test shifts the burden of proof to the
state to demonstrate that the governmental intrusion serves a compelling state interest, and
does so through the least intrusive means. Id.
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governmental intrusion. However, there must exist a reasonable
expectation of privacy before the strict scrutiny standard will be
used.1 1
Assuming that the decision to wear a seat belt falls within the
sphere of personal autonomy,0 2 the state probably could demon-
strate that the new seat belt law serves several compelling state
interests, namely, saving lives, preventing serious injuries, and eas-
ing the financial burden that the state often incurs in the care of
injured individuals. Whether the seat belt law is the least intrusive
means of serving this interest is problematic, but it is doubtful
that the courts would second-guess the legislature on this question.
More likely, courts will avoid reaching the question by simply re-
fusing to ascribe a right of privacy to the use of seat belts. In any
event, Florida motorists should resign themselves to the all but in-
evitable: the Constitution's sharp sword probably will not strike
down the seat belt law.
VII. CONCLUSION
By passing the FSBL the legislature has tried to protect Flor-
ida's motorists. But by doing so has it embarked upon the slippery
slope of paternalism, treading blithely on individual liberty?
One senator suggested that a substantial number of lives could
be saved by outlawing cigarettes and alcohol.20 3 He also proposed
mandating shower harnesses to prevent bathtub falls. ' The FSBL
is not so oppressive. The relatively inconsequential penalty, cou-
pled with the stipulation that the law be enforced only in conjunc-
tion with some other wrong, permits Florida motorists to flout the
FSBL with near impunity.
But in appeasing the critics, did the legislature so tame the bill
as to render it impotent? Perhaps the FSBL's strength lies not in
its limited capacity to penalize but in its substantial potential to
serve as a gentle reminder to buckle up. Whether it be regarded as
legislative mollycoddling 20 5 or good government, there is every in-
dication that the FSBL will result in greater seat belt use in Flor-
ida. In New York, restraint use increased from 16% to 69% after
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-53 (1973) (recognizing protected privacy
interest for decisions on procreation).
203. S. Comm. Tape, supra note 74 (remarks of Sen. Langley).
204. FLA. S. JouR. 422 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986) (amendment 1 to CS for HB 40).
205. Sen. Dempsey J. Barron, Dem., Panama City, coined the term "milk-feeding" to
describe the bill's paternalistic approach. May 28 Senate Debate, supra note 5.
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the seat belt statute went into effect; about 57 % of residents con-
tinue to comply with the law.'Q0
If the FSBL is obeyed it may save lives, prevent injuries, and
reduce automobile insurance costs. According to Insurance Com-
missioner Bill Gunter:
If Florida had had [this] law in 1984, and just fifty percent of our
people had complied with it, we would have finished that year 431
lives richer; we would have prevented 6,657 expensive and painful
human injuries; and we would have saved more than twelve mil-
lion in real dollars which were spent patching these victims back
together ... 207
If Commissioner Gunter is correct and the FSBL succeeds in
prodding Floridians to buckle up, the future may see this litany of
loss become a celebration of savings.
206. Wells v. State, 495 N.Y.S.2d 581, 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
207. S. Comm. Tape, supra note 74.
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